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EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER AS
INTERPRETED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Brent J. Belnap*
In creating an apparently simple and distinct
division of powers in the Constitution outlining
legislative and executive responsibilities to conduct foreign affairs, the Founding Fathers did
not foresee fundamental constitutional questions
that would arise as a result of increasingly
complex foreign entanglements.
Despite the
intended clarity of the Constitution, which is
surprisingly reticent about foreign affairs powers,
numerous cases have arisen necessitating the
clarification of the proper role of the Executive in
exercising his constitutional authority.
Recognizing the political nature of many of
the cases which have come before it, the Supreme
Court has refrained from limiting or separating
presidential duties into a specific sphere of
authority; rather, the Court has upheld the
evolution of the Chief Executive into his current
role as world leader and spokesman in the international arena for the United States. The political, and thus non -justiciable, nature of his office
has forced the Court to support and promote the
increasing power of the President. Thus, since
the early days of the Republic, he has steadily
accumulated immense powers in the field of foreig'n affairs.
*Brent is a senior majoring' in Political
Science.
Last spring he served an internship
with the U. S. Court of Appeals, D. C. Circuit. A
National Merit scholar, Brent is this year's president of Pi Sigma Alpha. He plans to attend law
school this Fall.
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Early issues over the treaty-making power
were often concerned with the newly acquired
lands from Spain and France. As the people of
the nation began to inhabit these lands, the
treaty-making power regarding (vis-a-vis) the
"sovereign"
Indian
nations
was
frequently
questioned.
Rapid changes in international
relations set the stage for constitutional conflict
between the political branches of government. As
the United States became more involved in
international affairs, especially following its burst
upon the world scene of diplomacy and commerce
after World War I, the expanded powers of the
Executive in foreign affairs were subjected to
suit.
Over the years the Supreme Court has
declared the authority of the President's treatymaking power to be almost absolute in scope,
limited only by those restrictions imposed by
Congress. This paper will review chronologically
those landmark cases delineating the evolution of
the treaty-making power of the Chief Executive,
marking how his responsibility over foreign
affairs has grown.
John Locke, in The Second Treatise
Government, defends the occasional need for
executive to act "without the prescription of
law and sometimes even against it."
Giving
reasons, he states that

of
an
the
his

in some governments the lawmaking
power is not always in being, and is
usually too numerous and so too slow
for the dispatch requisite to execution,
and because also it is impossible to
foresee, and so by laws to provide for,
all accidents and r-ecessities that may
concern the public.
the

Careful to limit the power of the Executive,
Framers of the Constitution granted the
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President "titular" responsibility for the nation's
diplomatic relations in concert with, and subject
to, the will of Congress.
Construed to be a
rather benign but symbolic power. the Constitution granted to the President the power, "by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to
make Treaties," and the power to nominate and
appoint "Ambassado;rzs, [and] other public Ministers and Consuls."
The Chief Executive was
thus entrusted with flexible power over foreign
affairs to present a unitary voice on behalf of the
United States.
To Congress the Constitution
granted the pow~ to try "Offenses against the
Law of NatiS)ns"
and, most importantly, "To
declare War."
Both the President and Congress
were given authority over distinct fields of
international affairs, i. e. , the President was
assigned diplomatic authority, while Congress, the
more representative body. was granted power to
define the conduct and provide support for the
military.
It would appear that the division of
powers intended by the Framers of the Constitution was carefully and clearly formulated.
The Federalist Papers, a sort of textual
exegesis on the Constitution, reveals best the
diplomatic scope of foreign affairs intended exclusively for the presidency.
John Jay, in The
Federalist No. 64, outlined the President's unfiiUe
role in implementing treaties:
seldom happens in the negociation
[sic] of treaties of whatever nature,
but that perfect secrecy and immediate
dispatch are sometimes requisite. . . .
The convention have [sic J done well
therefore in so disposingof the power
of making treaties, that although the
president must in forming them act by
the advice and consent of the Senate,
yet he will be able to manage the
business of intelligence irs such manner
as prudence may suggest.
It
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Jay said further that because of the tenuous
condition of foreign affairs, where time and
circumstance require special judgment, the President is best suited to manage:
Thus we see that the constitution
provides that our negociations [sic] for
treaties shall have every advantage
which can be derived from talents,
information, integrity, and deliberate
investigations on the one hand, and
from €fecrecy and dispatch on the
other.
In The Federalist No. 75, Alexander Hamilton
stated that the treaty-making power did not fall
exclusively within either the executive or the
legislative branches, although
it will be found to partake more of the
legislative
than
of
the
executive
character. . . .
The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the
management of foreign neg'otiations,
point out the executive as the most fit
agent in those transactions. . . .
To have entrusted the power of
making treaties to the Senate alone,
would have been to relinquish the
benefits of the constitutional agency of
the presiden , in the conduct of foreig;n
negotiations. 7
Thus the apparent intent of the Framers, according to Jay and Hamilton, was to grant the Senate
firm control over the negotiation process, while
permitting the Executive a supportive voice.
During his first term as President, George
Washington developed the practice of appointing
envoys without the consent of the Senate. The
President firmly believed that the Senate would
function as an advisory council for conducting
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foreign affairs.
Over difficulties encountered
with the Senate in working out Indian treaties in
1789, Washington was led to remark that h§
"would be damned if he ever went there again."
Though refusing to appear before the Senate,
Washington continued to transmit only limited
information concerning the scope of any further
treaties. Presidents Adams and Jefferson followed
Washington's practice.
Thus the role of the
Senate in actively negotiating treaties was
reduced to giving or withholding consent to
agreements in which it took no active part. The
President, therefore, assumed the power to refuse
to submit a sig'ned treaty to the Senate, as that
body had not participated in its formulation.
Soon after the ratification of the ConstitutiOll, the judiciary effectively eliminated itself
from playing a role in adjudicating treaties. As
early gs 1796, the Supreme Court in Ware v.
Hylton listed several crucial questions concerning
adjudication of treaty violations. It noted that
"These are considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly
entirely incompetent to the 1Uxamination and decision of a Court of Justice."

pf

In 1801, speaking on behalf
the Court in
United States v. Schooner Peggy,
Chief Justice
Marshall noted the President's exclusive role in
foreign affairs:
The constitution of the United States
declares a treaty to be the supreme law
of the land.
Of consequence, its
obligation on the courts of the United
States must be admitted. It is certainly
true, that the execution of a contract
between nations is to be demanded
from, and in the general, superintended
by, the executive of each nation; and
therefore, whatever the decision of this
court may be, relative to the rights of
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parties litigating before it, the claim
upon the natio~2 if unsatisfied, may
still be asserted.

President Thomas Jefferson, in considering legal
methods of acquiring the Louisiana Purchase of

1803, believed it necessary to adopt a constitutional amendment. Finding this narrow interpretation of the Constitution impractical for quickly
acquiring the territory, he next considered
submitting the proposal to both houses of Congress.
Wanting to expedite the purchase even
sooner,
Jefferson
used
the
treaty power,
requiring only the approval of the Senate.
Of
course, it was necessary for both hOUf:fs of
Congress to approve the appropriation bill.
Following involvement in the War of 1812,
Chief Justice ,t1arshall in 1818, in United States
v.
Palmer, 1
recognized
the
Executive's
inherently superior role in foreign policy.
He
noted that
questions [concerning treaty provisions]
are generally rather political than legal
in their character. They belong more
properly to those who can declare what
the law shall be; who can place the
nation in such a position wi tll respect
to foreign powers as to their own
judgment shall appear wise; to wh<iW
are entrusted all its foreign relations.
Eleven years later, in Foster & Elam v. Neilsen, 16
Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed that a treaty
"addresses i'tfflf to the political, not the judicial
department. "
Charles Williams sought reimbursement from
the Suffolk Insurance Company of Boston for a
schooner seized near the Falkland Islands by the
government of Buenos Aires (later Argentina).
The executive branch had repeatedly refused to
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recognize the territorial claims by Buenos Aires
over the Falkla£es. In Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company,
the Supreme Court upheld the
right of the ship's captain, who was acting
according to the stated interests of the United
States, to travel in waters near the Falklands;
and the Suffolk Insurance Company was ruled
liable to pay for the loss of the vessel.
The
Court declared:
When the executive branch of the
government, which is charged with our
foreign relations, shall in its correspondence with a foreign nation assume a
fact in regard to the sovereignty of any
island or country, it is conclusive on
the judicial department.
And in this
view it is not material to inquire, nor is
it the province of the Court to determine, whether the executive be right or
wrong. It is enough to know, that in
the
exercise
of his
constitutional
functions, he had decided the question.
Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is oblig'atory on the people and government of
the Union.
If this were not the rule, cases
might often arise in which, on the most
important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there would be an irreconcilable
difference between the executive and
judicial departments. By one of these
departments, a foreign island or country might be considered as at peace
with the United States; whilst the other
would consider it in a state of war. No
well regulated government has ever
sanctioned a principle so unwise, ftPd
so destructive of national character.
Beginning in the 1830s, the trend for presidents to conduct foreign affairs through executive
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agreements increased rapidly.
During the first
fifty years following 1789, twenty-seven executive
agreements were entered into by presidents
without the consent of the Senate, while sixty
treaties were ratified.
During the next fifty
years, 238 executive agreements were signed as
compared with 215 treaties. For the third fifty
years, 917 executive agreements and only 524
treaties were signed. As early as 1845, John C.
Calhoun, in commenting upon the procedure
used
to
annex
Texas,
noted
the
extraconstitutional method used by the President and
Congress in formulating agreements to resolve
questions international in scope. He commented:
It is now admitted that what was sought
to be effected by the Treaty submitted
to the Senate, may be secured by a
joint resolution of the two houses of
Congress incorporating all its provisions. This mode of effecting it will
have the advantage of requiring only a
majority of the two hou~, instead of
two-thirds of the Senate.

This same means was employed fifty years
later when the United States acquired the
Hawaiian Islands. Unable to muster a two-thirds
majority in the Senate to approve the annexation
measure, President McKinley pushed a joint
resolution through both houses of Congress. This
time, the constitutionality of such an action was
brought :hefore the Supreme Court. In Hawaii v.
Mankichi
the Court approved the annexatIon.
Justice White even implied in one of the Insular
cases that acquisition of territory outside the
North American continent required the approval of
both houses of Congress. By 1912. in B. Altman
&
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
recognized executive agreements as equal to
treaties, greatly expanding the powers of the
President over foreign affairs.
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22
The Court in Doe v. Braden
continued to
uphold the personal discretIOn of the Executive in
matters of foreign affairs.
The question of
whether the King of Spain had the power to annul
a grant (important in this case in determing land
ownership in Florida) was deemed political and not
judicial.
The Court refused to go behind the
treaty, saying that the President and the Senate
ought to determine who was empowered to represent and speak for Spain. Since they had recognized the King as possessing this power, it was
not up to the Court to inquire whether they had
erred.
Chief Justice Taney stated that "the
courts of justice had no right to annul or disregard any . . . [treaty] provisions, unless they
violate the Constitution of the United States." He
continued:
It would be impossible for the executive

department of the Government to conduct our foreig'n relations with any
advantage to the country, and fulfill
the duties which the Constitution has
imposed upon it, if every court in the
country was authorized to inquire and
decide whether the person who ratified
the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation
had the power, by its constitution and
laws, to make ~ engagements into
which he entered.
Such decisions, the Court decided, were the
exclusive -prerogative of 2~he political branches.
In De Lima v. Bidwell
the Supreme Court
continued
to uphold its
position of noninterference with the political branches over
international affairs by avoiding the question of
whether the
House of Representatives was
required to appropriate funds to activate a
treaty.
the

In B. Altman & Company v. United States,25
Supreme Court ruled on the validity of
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executive agreements as treaties. Consistent with
the terms of the Tariff Act of 1897, the United
States had entered into a reciprocal trade
agreement with France, whereby duties on certain
imports
were set
at fixed
rates.
Under
Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, numerous
such executive agreements had been negotiated
under this act.
In this case the Federal
Government surprisingly argued against the
proposition that an executive agreement had the
same efficacy as a treaty.
The plaintiff brought suit against a high
duty on imported statuary which he believed
should have fallen under the negotiated agreement
with France. He argued that the ag'reement was
a treaty; that the terms "agreement," "treaty,"
and "conven tion " had historically been used
interchangeably; that the Supreme Court had
upheld numerous acts of Congress authorizing the
contraction of executive agreements; and that
these acts were deemed by Congress as formal,
legal, and binding upon all parties, i. e., they
were treaties.
The plaintiff went so far as to
argue that the treaty-making power of the President, in conjunction with the Senate, was sMP or dinate to the legislative powers of Cong'1'ess.
The question before the Court was whether
it had jurisdiction, according to the Circuit Court
of Appeals Act of 1891, to hear the case. That
act retained the right of the Supreme Court to
review cases involving' the construction of
treaties. Justice Day, commenting upon executive
agreements, ruled on behalf C?f the plaintiff ~hat
executive agreements were, In effect, treatIes,
and that the Court had jurisdiction.
He
declared:
While it may be true that this commercial agreement, made under authority of
the Tariff Act of 1897, sec. 3, was not
a treaty possessing the dignity of one
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reqUlrmg ratification by the Senate of
the United States. it was an international compact. negotiated between the
representatives of two sovereign nations
and made in the name and on behalf of
the contracting countries. and dealing
with important
commercial
relations
between the two countries. and was
proclaimed by the President.
If not
technically a treaty requiring ratification. nevertheless it was a compact
authorized by the Congress of the
United States. negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its
President. We think such a compact is
a treaty unffr the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act.
The Court thus recognized the authority of the
President to conclude commercial agreements with
foreign countries. equal in au thori ty to treaties.
as prescribed by Congress.
An act passed by Congress in 1918 implemented the Migratory Bird Treaty signed between
Great Britain and the United States in 1916
designed to protect the migratory birds of Canada
and the United States from extinction. Although
a law had earlier been passed by Congress legislating the terms of the second law. it had been
held unconstitutional.
This second act. now
claimed to be in force by the treaty. was also
challenged. The conflict arose in Missouri over
restrictions on hunting migratory birds. with
Missouri declaring violation of the Tenth Amendment.
In Missouri v. Holland. 28 Justice Holmes
declared: If Acts of Congress are the supreme law
of the land only when made ill pursuance of the
Constitution. while treaties are declared to be so
when m!§le under the authority of the United
States. "
The distinction made here. but often
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ignored, is that there is a fundamental difference
between treaties and executive agreements.
We do not mean to imply that there are
no qualifications to the treaty-making
power. . . . It is obvious that there
may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that
an act of Congress [i. e., reference to
the previous act passed by Congress or
an
executive
a~reement
granted
congressional authorIty] could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could, and it is not lig'hUy to be
assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, "a power which must
belong to and somewhere reside in
every civilized government" is not to be
found. . . .
The treaty in question
does not contravene any prohibitory
":ord~O to be found in the ConstitutIOll.

In May 1934 Congress passed a joint resolution
empowering the President to forbid the sale of
arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, who were then
fighting over disputed territory.
President
Roosevelt issued a proclamation, in force for 1i
years, embargoing the sale of arms to either
nation.
The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
was indicted for selling arms to Bolivia during
this period.

Irl;n United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. ,
the Supreme Court ruled again on the
validity of executive agreements. This time the
appellees declared that Congress had abdicated its
constitutional functions by delegating them to the
President, saying that the joint resolution left the
enforcement decision "t?32 the uncontrolled discretion of the President."
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Justice Sutherland stated that the contention
between treaties and executive agreements was
unimportant. "The whole aim of the resolution is
to affect a situation entirely external to the
United States, a~~ falling- within the category of
foreign affairs."
The issue of whether the
resolution constituted a delegation of powers by
Congress to the President was invalid in this
case; the President is delegated authority to
conduct the nation's foreign affairs.
Judicial
responsibili ty in determining the proper execution
of enumerated powers necessary and proper for
the functioning of government, said Sutherland,
applies only to the nation's internal affairs.
Justice Sutherland stated further:
In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He makes
treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate; but he alone negotiates.
Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and S<.ingress itself is
powerless to invade it.
In speaking further on executive authority,
Justice Sutherland stated:
We are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of
international relations--a power which
does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but
which . . . must be exercised in subordination to the ~plicable provisions
of the Constitution.
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Justice Sutherland strongly stressed the President's need for "dis§lietion and freedom from
statutory restriction,"
citing President Washington's refusal to lay before Congress the documents of negotiation for the Jay Treaty.
The
Court thus upheld executive agreements as valid,
declaring them binding and constitutional by
time-honored legislative practice.
In 1933 the United States and the Soviet
Union signed the Litvinov Assignment, part of an
executive ag'reement allowing each nation to settle
claims still standing' since the Russian Revolution.
Each nation was assigned title to claims within its
borders.
The Federal Government attempted to
recover funds deposited with August Belmont, a
private banker who passed away in the interim.
Belmont's executors claimed protection under New
York law prohibiting confiscation of property.
TI;n Supreme Court in United States v.
Belmont
quickly declared that "no state policy
can prev~8against the international compact here
involved."
The President, who had recognized
the Soviet government and had established normal
relations, created, in effect, an "international
compact . . . And in respect of what was done
here, the Executive had authority % speak as the
sole organ" of the United States.
The Court
declared further that an international compact "is
not always a treaty ~wch requires the participation of the Senate."
The Court pointed out
the difference, citing B. Altman & Co. v. United
States. In that case the Court upheld executive
agreements arising under the Tariff Act of 189:,
"authorizing the President to conclude commercIal
agreements with {<Ireign countri~s in certain
specified matters. "
In commentmg upon the
Altman decision, Justice Sutherland said:
We held that although this might not be
a treaty requiring ratification by the
Senate, it was a compact negotiated and
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proclaimed under the authority of the
President, and as such was a 'treaty'
within the mean!~g of the Circuit Court
of Appeals Act.
Thus the Court placed those executive agreements
properly
concluded
under
Altman
and
Curtiss-Wright precedents on par with officially
ratified treaties and extended the arguments used
for treaties J!f Missouri v. Holland to all executive
agreements.
A second case stemming from the 4.titvinov
Assignment was United States v. Pink,
which
concerned the recovery of funds from a Russian
insurance company.
The Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the agreement, explaining that the
resolution of claims between both nations was vital
in normalizing relations. Thus two cases discussing the binding' power of executive agreements
reconfirmed the agreements to be enforceable as
treaties.
As late as 1953. Chief Judge Parker of the
Fourth Circuit declared that "it is clear that the
executive may not throug'h entering into such an
ag'reement [with Canada restricting potato importation not authorized by Congress] avoid compl~5
ing with a regulation prescribed by Congress."
On api>~al the Supreme Court in United States v.
Capps
overturned the decision by the lower
court, - finding that the agreement did not
contravene a congressional statute.
47
In Reid v. Covert,
the Supreme Court
overturned its own earlier ruling on the same
case two years earlier. Mrs. Clarice Covert had
been convicted of killing her husband, a sergeant
in the U. S. Air Force, while residing in England.
A civilian. she was tried by a court-martial for
the murder.
This time the Court ruled that
military law cannot be applied to dependents of
servicemen living in foreign countries.
Justice
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Black, speaking on behalf of the Court, ruled
ag-ainst an executive ag'reement between the
United States and Great Britain granting United
States military courts exclusive jurisdiction in
Great Britain over servicemen or their dependents
for crimes committed.
His opinion outlines the
restrictions placed upon the Executive in formulating agreements.
Quoting the supremacy
clause of the Constitution (art. VI), he states:
There is nothing in this language which
intimates that treaties and laws enacted
pursuant to them do not have to comply
with the provisions of the Constitution.
Nor is there anything in the debates
which accompanied the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution which
even suggests such a result.
These
debates as well as the history that
surrounds the adoption of the treaty
provision in Article VI make it clear
that the reason treaties were not limited
to those made in "pursuance" of the
Constitution was so that agreements
made by the United States under the
Articles of Confederation, including the
important peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would
remain in effect.
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of
those who created the Constitution, as
well as those who were responsible for
the Bill of Rights--Iet alone alien to our
entire constitutional history and tradition--to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power
under
an
international
agreement
without
observing
constitutional
prohibitions.
In
effect,
such
construction would permit amendment of
that
document
in
a
manner
not
sanctioned
by
Article
V.
The
prohibitions of the Constitution were
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designed to apply to all branches of the
National Government and they cannot be
nullified by the Executive or by 4ffhe
Executive and the Senate combined.
Therefore, agreements cannot bypass prohibitions or grants of power of the Constitution,
but law can be formulated through them, as
upheld in Missouri v. Holland.
Justice Brennan, deliveri~ the opmlOn of
the Court in Baker v. Carr,
summarized the
Court's authority to rule upon treaty law. He
declared that "it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. . . . A
court can construe a treaty" for an answer. but
will not do so "in a manner i~onsistent with a
subsequent federal statute."
In outlining
further the power of the courts to decide upon
treaty law, Justice Brennan, speaking for the
Court, declared:
While recognition of foreign governments
so strongly defies judicial treatment
that without executive recognition a
foreign state has been called "a
republic of whose existence we know
nothing, " and the judiciary ordinarily
follows the Executive as to which nation
has
sovereignty
over
disputed
territory, once sovereignty over an
area is
politically
determined and
declared,
courts may examine the
resulting
status
and
decide
independently whether a statute applies
to that area. Similarly, recognition of
belligerency abroad is an executive
responsibility, but if the Executive
proclamations fall short of an explicit
answer, a court may construe them
seeking, for example, to determine
whether the situation is such that
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neutrality have become operative.

Here the authority of the Executive is
beholden to judicial interpretation once the necessary political decisions by him have been made.
On December 23. 1978. President - Carter
notified Taiwan of the United States' intention to
terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
two nations. a precursor to the normalization of
relations with the People's Republic of China.
Senator Goldwater filed suit against President
Carter for the unilateral cessation of the treaty.
although a clause permitted its abrogation after
one year's notice. A case involving e~t United
States senators. Goldwater v. Carter.
directly
confronted the constitutional question of whether
the approval of the Senate was required in the
termination as well as the ratification of treaties.
The U. S . Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia concurred with the President's
actions. rejecting the district court's decision that
the President's powers in foreign affairs were
plenary.
The appellate court noted the President's role as the first and last voice in implementing treaties.
The Supreme Court vacated judgment and
remanded the case to the district court, instructing it to dismiss the complaint.
The view that
this case involved a political question did not
command a majority of the Court.
Justice
Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, argued that
the issue was political in part because the Constitution "is silent as to [the Senate's] participation
in the abrogation of a treaty; " therefore, the
question was "controlleg by political standards"
3
and was non-justiciable.
Justice Powell rejected
the "political question" precedent and stated that
the issue was not yet ripe for adjudication,
Congress not yet being united in its response to
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the President. 54 Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, also rejected the political question
issue; however, he recognized the precedents
that "firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, - an~ withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes. "
It has been argued that presidential authority in foreign affairs is the product of past
unchallenged use~6 of power. Thus, in Dames &
Moore v. Re~an,
the Supreme Court, followmg
the Iranian ostage crisis, recognized the power
of the Executive to settle foreign claims because
congressional acquiescence to this long-standing
presidential practice had created a powerful
precedent.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian Islamic fundamentalists overran the United States embassy in
Tehran and held their American hostages captive
for 444 days. Ten days after their capture, on
November 14, 1979, President Carter blocked the
removal or transfer of all property and interests
of the government of Iran subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as United States
practice had solidly established the resolution of
claims settlements through executive agreements.
The day before leaving office, on January
President Carter issued a series of
executive orders implementing the terms of agreements between the United States and Iran negotiated through Algeria calling for the establishment
of an Iran-United States claims tribunal to ar~7
trate claims not settled within six months.
Pursuant to the agreement, on January 20, 1981
the American hostages were released by Iran.
One month later, President Reagan reaffirmed the
prior executive orders of President Carter and
required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer
them to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.
President Reagan suspended all further claims
19,

1981,
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based on the resolution of the tribunal, saying
they would no longer have effect in United States
courts.
Dames and Moore challenged the President's
position, claiming the President had no authority
to implement the Algerian Agreement that, in
effect, amounted to the taking of property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the Algerian Agreement between the United States and Iran creating
the international tribunal, stating that no violation of the Fifth Amendment had occurred.
The Court held that under the terms of the
Emergency Economic Powers Act of
1977,
intended by Congress to severely limit
the emergency powers of the Executive, the
President was authorized to nullify any attachments upon Iranian assets following November 14,
1979. It also ruled that, pursuant to the Economic Powers Act and the Hostage Act, the
President's authority in dealing with international
crises was proper. Since Congress had implicitly
approved the practice of claims settlement by
executive agreement, the President was also able
to suspend the claims. However, the Court, by
striking down a section of the United States Code
forbidding further claims, ignored the important
treaty exception, thereby allowing further cl~§ls
to be heard in the United States Claims Court.
Inter~~tional

One scholar, in discussing the far-reaching'
implications of the Dames & Moore decision,
declares the decision incorrect.
He states that
instead of extending the powers of the President
in foreign affairs, the decision may have had the
opposite effect. The Supreme Court ruled section
1502 (the treaty exception) of Title 28 of the
United States Code unconstitutional, and thus
"the Court created a significant problem
the
conduct of United States foreign policy."
He
continues:
"The Supreme Court departed from
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this tradition [relief of claims in the political
arena] by recognizing an unprecedented judicial
remedy for those whose interests are adversely
affected by United States foreign policy. . . .
[The Court] ignored a longstanding jurisdictional
principle" known as the Meade Doctrine which
bars judicial reexamination of international arbitration awards, thereby creating "potential complicatio~ for the conduct of United States foreign
policy. "
Since President Washington's administration,
successive presidents have taken advantage of
their special access to information and the lack of
clear constitutional definitions in dealing with
other nations to formulate foreign policy. As can
be seen, the complexity of the treaty-making
cases such as Dames & Moore indicates the fundamental constitutional challenges in defining the
enormous scope of power of the Chief Executive.
The ability to act swiftly, secretly, and unitarily
is a powerful force of the President.
The Supreme Court recognized early the
responsibility of the Executive in formulating the
nation's foreign policy. Later, as congressional
acquiescence in foreign affairs decisions became a
noticeable trend,
presidential immunity from
congressional restriction was often upheld by the
Court because of the undefined scope and relative
freedom of the President's foreign policy powers.
Yet the issue of how broad those powers are
remains unresolved.
Splits in the Supreme
Court, as indicated in the discussion of Goldwater
v. Carter, reveal a lack of a coherent approach
to the definition of what constitutes a political
question. Meanwhile, the use of executive agreements, now held to be legally binding as treaties
when compatible with the Constitution, continues
to increase. Further challenges in foreig-n policy
and litigation in America's courts await as the
three branches of federal government continue to
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fill in the gray areas of the treaty-making power
in the Constitution.
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